Published on 18 Nov 2008 under category: article
James Brenan, Solicitor
1. Introduction
These notes are intended to show how the law constituting lessee-owned blocks of flats is not ideally fit for purpose, to introduce the idea of conversion to commonhold, while setting out some of the problems which that poses, and to give a summary of how commonhold works.
These notes are written by James Brenan, a solicitor of many years experience in property litigation matters, as general guidance. They are not a substitute for a solicitor’s advice on the specific facts of any situation and no responsibility is accepted for any decisions or action taken without obtaining such specific advice.
Throughout these notes the terms “tenant” and “lessee” are used interchangeably and the abbreviation “LMC” is used to refer to a leaseholders’ management company, whether owing the freehold (or reversion) or not.
2. The Decline of Investor-Landlords
In a significant percentage of all blocks of flats lessees now own the right to manage and in most of these cases they also own the reversion to their leases. This trend is growing as more groups of lessees (and potentially Rent Act tenants as well) take advantage of the right of first refusal under the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987 (“the 1987 Act”), and as more groups of lessees utilise the right of collective enfranchisement under the Leasehold Reform, etc Act 1993 (“the 1993 Act”) and the recent no-fault right to manage. There is also the fault-dependent right under the 1987 Act to apply to a leasehold valuation tribunal (“LVT”) for the appointment of an independent manager, which is a precursor to lessees later obtaining an acquisition order to acquire their block’s reversion or freehold.
The typical vehicle for such collective ownership was until 2003 the private company limited by share capital. Following the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 (“the 2002 Act”), this familiar type of legal entity has been joined by the Right to Manage (“RTM”) company. That Act and its regulations have also given recognition to a fact known by a good many practitioners: that companies limited by guarantee are more effective and efficient vehicles to use for these non-profit-seeking purposes.
In practice there are a variety of types of persons or entities owning the freeholds or reversions of blocks of flats on behalf groups of tenants, as follows:-
- up to 4 tenants owning in their own names and, one hopes, as parties to a deed of trust and co-ownership agreement (and this invokes the law of trusts as the legal background, which has differences to company law that may become significant in the event of any dispute);
- a company limited by shares owned by a group of tenants, often but not necessarily comprising all of the tenants; and
- a company limited by guarantee, owned as above.
It is also relevant to take into account the following who may simply manage the block:-
- an independent manager, appointed by an LVT under the 1987 Act – which has a unique advantage: after 2 years the tenants can obtain the freehold under an acquisition order without having to pay anything for marriage value; and
- an RTM company owning only the right to manage.
3. The Self-Destructive Potential of Lessees Management Companies
What happens if a lessee in an LMC-owned block goes to a LVT and enforces the principle whereby service charges must only be in respect of expenses lawfully incurred by the lessor under the terms of the lease? Or if that lessee enforces the rule that such expenses must be no more than reasonable in their amount? There will be a service charge reduction and this may have effect throughout the block because the complainant’s case will in effect have become a representative action in behalf of all the lessees. In consequence the expenditure of that lessee’s own company will exceed its service charge income by the amount of those irrecoverable expenses and also no doubt by its litigation costs paid and thrown away. Indeed, the complainant may seek an order pursuant to Section 20C of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 prohibiting these costs from being paid for with service charge funds. A similar loss to the LMC would also arise if it incurs a liability to pay damages to a lessee, for example by allowing a roof to leak into a flat, because leases typically do not allow a lessor to recoup damages payments via service charges.
The LMC will have to find this shortfall of funds by some other means or else it will become insolvent. It is might be able to raise an ad hoc levy against its members. Under Section 25 of the Companies Act 2006, such a power would have to be present in a company’s memorandum and articles from its incorporation. An example of the wording of such a provision in a company’s articles of association appears in the reported Court of Appeal judgment in Morshead Mansions Limited v. Mactra Properties Limited [2007] 2 BCLC 88.
Commonhold associations, in contrast, have the power to levy annual “assessments” against unit owners to meet their expenses and they will have far less exposure to litigation in respect of management decisions. An executive summary of the features of commonhold ownership appears below.
4. The Excessive Bureaucracy and Legalism of Leasehold Structures
Leases have represented the legal constitution of one of the most potentially mistrustful relationships that our society and legal system have created: that of landlord and tenant. Landlords have traditionally advanced their rights in the most catch-all and aggressive language that their lawyers could imagine – you only need to read a forfeiture clause to see this – and tenants have drawn some boundaries to defend themselves. Parliament and the courts have weighed into the conflict on countless occasions, no doubt with the best of intentions but leaving the law encrusted with rigid and arcane rules and procedures that add to the expense of management. LMCs are bound by numerous unnecessary and restrictive duties, each potentially enforceable by a single disaffected lessee within any block. A single disaffected lessee can cause great losses for the others by taking legalistic points over management issues – and this is often a particular problem when there is less than full participation by all the lessees in freehold ownership via the management company.
One example of this strictness is Section 42 of the 1987 Act, whereby service charge funds and sinking funds must be held by the lessor in separate trust accounts. The capital receipts to the trust fund are not taxable but the income produced by investing the fund pending disbursement is. There is now only a 20% rate of tax on this income since Section 65 of the Finance Act 2007 came into effect. (Previously the rate was 40%.)
Another example is the elaborate infrastructure of rules requiring landlords to submit to management audits and give transparency of information regarding expenditure and budgeting for significant works and any long term service agreements. You might be forgiven for assuming that in situations where the body of tenants appoints the directors of a non-profit-making freeholder company and can hold those officers to account through company law mechanisms it would be unnecessary to comply with rules designed to rein in external landlords – but this commonsense approach is nowhere recognised by the law. LMCs are treated as if they were investor-landlords whose interests and intentions conflict with the tenants’. (In fairness, investor-landlords have a legitimate interest in the management of their estates which naturally and often will not match the views of lessees.)
Similarly LMCs are constrained in the same way as any investor-landlord not to utilise service charge funds for making any pure improvements or additions of new amenities to their blocks. Thus, it will contravene the typical wording of any lease for, say, an area of tarmac to be landscaped for a new children’s’ play area to be built, or even for new security measures such as a CCTV system to be put in place. (Notwithstanding this legal position, some LMCs have been known to take their chances and transgress these strictures – but it is always risky for them.)
5. Development of Retained Space
Aside from the fund-raising considerations, some LMCs are at liberty to develop retained space around or above their blocks while others are not – depending on the wordings of their leases. The issue of development of retained space tends to generate strong feelings among an LMC’s members. Some see it as an ideal way of generating money for refurbishing and improving their block while others dislike the idea intensely. Many leases are not immediately clear on this point and so they have to be read as a whole and considered against their factual background in order to give their meaning on it. The judgment in Hannon v. 169 Queen’s Gate Ltd [2000] 1 EGLR 40 acknowledged that ownership of a block’s reversion by an LMC is a proper matter to take into account when interpreting an ambiguous lease on this question - in favour of finding this development right to exist. (It may be of interest that such ownership, by an LMC, is also a relevant factor in giving a wider than normal interpretation to a service charges clause in a lease regarding the recovery of management expenses.) Commonhold law approaches this issue in a different way, as will be seen below.
This example illustrates how haphazardly leasehold laws will constitute relationships and the potential for lease-based conflicts to spill over into litigation. Arguments over standards and costs of communal services and charges often fester in the same way under leasehold laws.
6. The Alternative of Commonhold
Taken together with the irrelevance and inconvenience of their leases having finite terms of years and requiring payment of ground rents that will now be arbitrary in amount as well as taxable income in their hands, the above disadvantages of leasehold are likely to cause many tenants that own their lease reversions through the vehicle of an LMC to consider changing over to commonhold.
Commonhold represents an attempt to move away from the vagaries and hostilities that are inherent to the leasehold system by unifying property law rules with corporate governance rules and by including some less drastic methods for dispute avoidance and resolution and excluding the threat of forfeiture.
Commonhold schemes will all have a statutory core of standardised documentation – albeit with options and spaces for customised additions, known as “local rules”.
Commonhold associations’ memoranda and articles of association and community statements will contain measures to protect unit owners against over-assertive majorities – covering such issues as the right to be or to elect directors, special majorities for particular major decisions and disclosure of management documents.
There will be no trust in favour of members in respect of annual assessment money collected by the association. However, Section 39 of the 2002 Act and its regulations provide for separate funds to be held for the repair and maintenance for the common parts and the commonhold units. Reserve funds covering future years’ expenditure are to be voluntary. Income that arises on any reserve fund will be liable to corporation tax – as will any incidental profit generated by the association. Money held in a reserve fund is not available to pay to any judgment creditor of the association except in relation to a reserve fund activity.
The above development of retained space (or Hannon) question is left by the 2002 Act to be dealt with as a matter for local rules in commonhold community statements - which depend initially on the full agreement of the founding owners, can contain entrenched (unalterable) provisions and otherwise are alterable by majority vote of unit owners.
Directors of commonhold associations will be bound by compulsory provisions in all commonhold community statements to follow a detailed procedure each year for estimating expenditure and reserve fund needs and notifying these amounts to unit owners. Owners must be told how they can object and that there is a one month time limit for objections. The directors are bound to consider objections received. They must then give a further formal notice to owners requiring payments. (There is a shorter procedure for cases of emergency expenditure.) Interest automatically accrues on late payments.
As there is no statutory duty of reasonableness for such assessments there will be less scope for challenging them in court, compared to the ability of tenants to challenge the amounts of service changes. We do not yet know the courts’ attitude to intervening in commonhold associations’ decisions but the indications are that they will do so only very sparingly.
In the first year after registration of a scheme the directors must consider whether to commission a reserve study by a professional person, and they must commission such a study at least once in every 10 years.
7. Establishing a Commonhold Scheme from Leasehold
Section 3 of the 2002 Act prevents any land from being registered as commonhold unless every lessee whose term was granted for 21 years or more joins with the freeholder in applying. Mortgagees of those leases must also give consent. Such agreement can be made subject to conditions, such as that the lessee concerned receives a commonhold unit according to a particular constitution or receives compensation. Unanimity will usually be unobtainable from any large or disparate group, or it may be too daunting to attempt to get this. Regulations allow a dispensing power of the Court, on application where the non-consenting party cannot be identified or traced or if they simply refuse to respond.
Once a government fully recognises the deficiencies of leasehold law for LMCs and decides to promote commonhold more vigorously we might see new regulations fixing an overridable proportion of non-consenting lessees. (Section 37 of the 1987 Act could be a useful template for Parliament to adopt if and when that happens: it facilitates all the leases in a block to be amended by an order of an LVT, subject to certain safeguards for the dissenting owners, where 75% of owners in the block actively support the proposal and less than 10% of owners actively oppose it.)
In order for a commonhold scheme to be attractive to all lessees of a block the service charge liability shares and any ground rents would first have to be proportionate among them and their lease term periods would have to be equal, or else the conversion process would have to provide for compensation payments. (It is quite known for developers of blocks to retain a flat for their own enjoyment and to award that flat an unfairly light share of the service charge liabilities; purchasers of flats have often missed this trick because their advisers have failed to scrutinise the sizes of flats in comparison to service charge shares.) It may assist in this regard that the LVT’s power to vary leases will probably be extended by regulations pursuant to Section 162 of the 2002 Act – enlarging the grounds under Section 35 of the 1987 Act for variation where a lease “fails to make satisfactory provision” – and of the 1987 Act already provides for compensation in these cases. Altering a lease’s term period, however, is more than a mere variation: it is a termination and regrant.
8. Executive Summary of Commonhold
In further outline, commonhold schemes have the following features:
The above is merely a summary of the rules affecting the governance of commonhold schemes and is necessarily incomplete. For example, no coverage is attempted here as to the rules concerning the insolvency of commonhold associations and their winding up. One thing to note in particular is the unusually detailed regulation of directors’ duties, in addition to their usual company law duties. Any one contemplating becoming a director of a commonhold has a lot of preparation to do – first in learning the rules and then in following them at regular stages throughout the accounting year. Professional managing agents will in practice be necessary.
9. Acceptance of Commonhold by Mortgage Lenders.
Some mortgage lenders are not convinced that commonhold offers them an acceptable security. In particular, they are concerned by the potential problems in store in the event of insolvency of the commonhold association.
You therefore should proceed with caution before deciding to convert to or establish any or to convert a block to commonhold or to establish a new commonhold scheme. Your solicitor will need to advise on the present situation regarding acceptability to mortgagees.
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